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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 13-2567 
 ___________ 
 
 GEORR M. BIRLA, 
  Appellant 
 
v. 
 
NEW JERSEY BOARD OF NURSING;  
MR. GEORGE J. HERBERT, Executive Director, et al. 
____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. Civ. No. 2-12-cv-01612) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Stanley R. Chesler 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 12, 2013 
 
 Before:  SMITH, GARTH and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: November 19, 2013) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Georr M. Birla appeals pro se from the order of the District Court dismissing his 
amended complaint.  We will affirm. 
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 Birla, who is African American, filed pro se a two-page Title VII complaint 
against the New Jersey Board of Nursing and its executive director George J. Herbert, 
alleging, in conclusory fashion, that they refused to issue him a license to work as a 
Certified Homecare Health Aide because of “racial and retaliatory discrimination.”  On 
defendants’ motion to dismiss, the District Court dismissed Birla’s complaint on the 
ground that he had not alleged that defendants are his “employers” under Title VII.  See, 
e.g., George v. N.J. Bd. of Veterinary Med. Exam’rs, 794 F.2d 113, 114 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(holding that a licensing board that denied the plaintiff a license is not a Title VII 
“employer”).  The District Court’s dismissal was without prejudice, however, and the 
District Court granted Birla leave to amend to assert any federal claims he might have, 
including any claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Birla filed both an amended complaint and 
a notice of appeal, and we dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the 
District Court had not entered a final judgment.  (C.A. No. 12-4422, Apr. 3, 2013.) 
 Birla’s three-page amended complaint again sought relief under Title VII and also 
invoked § 1983.  This time, Birla added the allegation that defendants denied him a 
license because their criminal history background check, which he characterized without 
elaboration as a “racial and retaliatory discriminatory practice,” revealed “inaccurate 
records more than 15 years old.”  Defendants again filed a motion to dismiss, and the 
District Court again granted it.  The District Court once again dismissed Birla’s Title VII 
claims for lack of a Title VII “employer.”  It also liberally construed his complaint as 
asserting an equal protection violation under § 1983.  The District Court dismissed 
3 
 
Birla’s § 1983 claims for damages against the Board and against Herbert in his official 
capacity because state agencies and officials in their official capacities are not “persons” 
subject to liability for damages under § 1983.  See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 
491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); McCauley v. Univ. of the V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 241 (3d Cir. 2010).  
The District Court dismissed Birla’s § 1983 claims against Herbert in his personal 
capacity and for injunctive relief because Birla’s conclusory allegations did not show any 
plausible entitlement to relief, and thus did not satisfy the pleading standard of which the 
District Court had notified him in its previous opinion.  See Phillips v. Cnty. of 
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544 (2007)).  The District Court dismissed most of Birla’s claims with prejudice.  Its 
dismissal of Birla’s § 1983 claims against Herbert personally and for injunctive relief, 
however, was “without prejudice.”  The District Court did not explain the intended effect 
of that dismissal, but it did not expressly give Birla leave to amend as it had done before 
and the case remains marked “closed” on the District Court docket.  Birla appeals. 
II. 
 The District Court’s dismissal of some of Birla’s claims without prejudice raises a 
threshold jurisdictional issue.  A dismissal without prejudice generally does not constitute 
a final order reviewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because it does not finally resolve the 
litigation and instead implicitly invites the plaintiff to replead.  See Borelli v. City of 
Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951-52 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam).  Under the circumstances, 
however, we construe the District Court’s order as final.   
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 The District Court clearly knew how to give Birla leave to amend when that was 
its intent, and it chose not to do so a second time.  Moreover, the District Court cited 
Phillips in discussing the pleading standard, and we went on in that case to repeat our 
long-standing suggestion “that district judges expressly state, when appropriate, that the 
plaintiff has leave to amend. . . .”  Phillips, 515 F.3d at 236 (quoting Shave v. Fauver, 213 
F.3d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2000)); see also Pennsylvania Family Inst., Inc. v. Black, 489 F.3d 
156, 163 n.4 (3d Cir. 2007) (deeming the lack of any statement that the plaintiffs had 
leave to amend an indicia of finality).  Because the District Court did not grant Birla 
leave to amend again, we do not construe its dismissal of certain claims “without 
prejudice” as an implicit invitation to file another amended complaint.  Instead, we 
construe it merely as a statement that the District Court did not reach the merits of Birla’s 
claimed but inadequately pleaded entitlement to federal relief, which means that its ruling 
is without prejudice to Birla’s ability to seek whatever relief might be available in state 
court.  In sum, we conclude that the District Court intended its order to finally resolve the 
case, and we thus have jurisdiction under § 1291. 
III. 
 Turning to the merits, and reviewing Birla’s complaints de novo, we agree that 
dismissal was appropriate for the reasons summarized above and discussed more 
thoroughly by the District Court.  No matter how liberally construed, neither of Birla’s 
complaints raises any inference that defendants have violated Title VII or any other 
federal law.  Nor can we say that the District Court abused its discretion in declining to 
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grant Birla leave to file another amended complaint, and Birla does not argue otherwise.  
The District Court explained the pleading standard in its initial order granting Birla leave 
to amend, and it even went so far as to suggest that he might be attempting to assert 
claims that might be actionable under § 1983.  Birla’s second conclusory attempt to state 
a federal claim, however, suffered from the same deficiencies as his first.  Nothing in 
Birla’s complaints suggests that he could assert a plausible federal claim if again given 
leave to plead his claims in more detail.  Nor does anything in Birla’s briefs, in which he 
makes certain allegations for the first time on appeal.  We generally do not consider 
allegations made for the first time on appeal, but we note that Birla’s new allegations still 
fail to suggest the existence of any plausible federal claim.1  Finally, Birla raises certain 
legal arguments for the first time in his reply brief.  We generally do not consider 
arguments raised for the first time in reply either, but we note that Birla’s arguments are 
either inapposite or otherwise lack merit.2 
                                                 
1 Birla now alleges that he graduated from a certified nursing program and that, although 
he provided defendants with evidence that he has not been convicted of a disqualifying 
crime and was deemed eligible for certification in November 2011, defendants still have 
not placed him in the database of those eligible for employment.  (Appellant’s Br. at 4.)  
Defendants, also for the first time on appeal, respond that they notified Birla that he 
would be licensed upon their receipt of certain documentation that he still has not 
provided.  (Appellees’ Br. at 4 n.1.)  We express no opinion on these allegations except to 
note that Birla’s new allegations do not suggest that he could further amend his complaint 
to state a plausible federal claim. 
 
2 For example, Birla argues that the Board is a Title VII “employer” because its licensing 
decision controls his eligibility for employment, but that argument is squarely foreclosed 
by our holding in George that “Title VII . . . is not applicable to the licensing functions of 
a public agency exercised under the police powers of a state.”  George, 794 F.2d at 114. 
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IV. 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  Our ruling is 
without prejudice to Birla’s ability to seek whatever relief may be available in the New 
Jersey state agencies or state courts, an issue on which we express no opinion.
